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THEORY WARS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 
Louise Weinberg* 
THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION IN THE COURTS: 
TODAY AND TOMORROW. By Symeon C. Symeonides. Leiden/Boston: 
Martinus Nuhoff Publishers. Forthcoming 2005.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Fifty years ago, at the height of modernism in all things, there was 
a great revolution in American choice-of-law theory. You cannot 
understand what is going on in the field of conflict of laws today 
without coming to grips with this central fact. With this revolution, the 
old formalistic way of choosing law was dethroned, and has occupied a 
humble position on the sidelines ever since. Yet there has been no 
lasting peace. The American conflicts revolution is still happening, and 
poor results are still frustrating good intentions. 
Now comes Dean Symeon Symeonides, 2 the author of the choice­
of-law code of Louisiana, 3 with an intriguing monograph, The 
American Choice-of-Law Revolution in the Courts. There is nothing in 
the field quite like it. 
* Holder of the Bates Chair and Professor of Law, University of Texas, J.D. 1969, 
Harvard; B.A. 1964 Cornell. - Ed. 
1 .  THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION will be made more generally 
available in a freestanding treatise edition in 2005. I am reviewing it here in a limited 2003 
printing available only to libraries. This 2003 printing, in turn, is an unabridged offprint of 
the same title published as volume 298 of the series RECUEIL DES COURS [Collected 
Courses] (Hague Academy of International Law 2002). 
2. Dean and Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law. Dean 
Symeonides has authored or edited fifteen books and some sixty articles in the fields of 
comparative and American conflicts law. 
3. See Book IV of Louisiana's Civil Code, 1991 La. Acts 923. Dean Symeonides has also 
drafted a proposed choice-of-law code for Puerto Rico, presently before Puerto Rico's 
legislature. He now chairs the committee drafting conflicts legislation for Oregon, 
the contracts provisions of which have been enacted. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 81.100 to 81.135 
(2003), and the torts provision of which is the subject of the committee's current work. See 
Symeon C. Symeonides, Codifying Choice of Law for Contracts: The Oregon Experience, 67 
RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 726 
(2003); Symeon C. Symeonides, Private lntemational Law Codification in a Mixed 
Jurisdiction: The Louisiana Experience, 57 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND 
INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 460 (1993); Symeon c. Symeonides, Revising Puerto 
Rico's Conflicts Law: A Preview, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 413 (1990). 
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Symeonides has given us a brilliant contribution to legal theory, an 
impressive, original, one-of-a-kind book, in which a good deal of 
valuable empirical research is the subject of thoughtful analysis, and in 
which the reader is offered, and sees in action, an original way of 
thinking about how to fashion rules for choosing law. 
No one else could have written this book. Symeonides speaks to us 
personally on every page. Nor could it have been written by anyone 
without Symeonides' intimate familiarity with current American 
conflicts cases. Over a span of seventeen years he has given generously 
of his time, as he still does, to the service, at once humble and 
invaluable, of producing annual surveys of conflicts cases in American 
courts.4 It was in this steady mining that he struck the mother-lode of 
material that enriches this book. Symeonides has come through years 
of work on his codifications of state conflicts rules, and through years 
of commentary on American decisions in the lower courts, and has 
emerged confident in his own outlook: conservative, traditional, 
deferent to the concerns of other countries and the needs of 
defendants, yet also humane about the needs of plaintiffs; writing with 
conviction, yet reasonable in argument. To all of this Dean 
Symeonides brings a formidable erudition. He is enviably conversant 
with emerging European as well as American theory, debate, 
problems, attempted solutions - and he reads his foreign sources in 
the original languages. But if The American Conflicts Revolution is a 
very personal book, often magnetic, a page-turner, it is because it is 
the honest record of an inner struggle, the culminating and central 
work of Symeonides' life. 
In Part I below I set out an intellectual history of modem conflicts 
theory and the controversies still plaguing it. This also serves to 
introduce the reader to the power of modem choice-of-law analysis. In 
Part II I take a brief look at the politics of the controversy. I note, in 
Part III, a recent empirical turn in the literature, of which Symeonides' 
work is a superior example. In Part IV, using interest-analytic 
methods, I begin to dig into Symeonides' treatment of irrationality in 
choices of law. I consider the advisability, in Part V, of a return to the 
law of the forum for intractable cases, and, in Part VI, Symeonides' 
view that forum law, and other features of modern methods, can 
disserve the higher values of the law. Here I evaluate Symeonides' 
analysis of a recent products case, Kelly v. Ford Motor Co. In Part VII, 
I discuss Symeonides' reluctant subordination of the ideal of 
4. See, most recently, Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 
2003: Seventeenth Annual Survey, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 9 (2004). There is no substitute for 
these surveys. It should be noted that Symeonides' surveys are hardly bare reports. His 
typology of the cases is very personal to him, and his commentary reflects the thinking which 
has culminated in The American Conflicts Revolution. At the 1999 Annual Meeting of the 
Association of American Law Schools, its Section on Conflict of Laws passed a resolution of 
appreciation for Symeonides' annual surveys project. 
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substantive justice to the ideal of neutrality, which he holds in highest 
esteem, and in Part VIII I argue that neutrality is a false value in the 
context in which Symeonides struggles to maintain it. These 
interesting differences in viewpoint do not, however, lessen my 
admiration for this engrossing new book. 
I. AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 
A. The American Legal Realists 
We can trace the intellectual history of the American conflicts 
revolution along four overlapping tracks. The opening salvo was fired 
in academia, when American legal realist writers of the 1920s and 
1 930s began aiming some of their most penetrating critiques at the 
field of conflict of laws. The realists deplored the sort of mechanical, 
formalistic legal methods of which the First Restatement of 1934 would 
be the embarrassing embodiment.5 The realists tore the polite veil of 
disinterestedness from the judicial process. They made us see that, 
disingenuously or deludedly, judges only professed to be complying 
with the command of inexorable bright-line rules. And choice-of-law 
rules seemed very bright-line indeed: "The law of the place of injury 
governs a tort." "The law of the place of contracting governs a 
contract." The American legal realists revealed to us that behind the 
curtain there was no magical wizard, no "mystic over-law,"6 no rules 
cut in stone, but only a fallible human being - a judge trying to do the 
right thing. Inevitably, judges were manipulating the seemingly fixed 
rules to produce desired results, and in this way obscuring to 
themselves and others the "inarticulate major premises" of their 
decisions.7 Pre-realist commentators would (rightly) praise as a sound 
application of law a result they deemed just, and condemn one they 
deemed unjust; but in so doing they were replicating the hidden 
thinking that was deciding the cases. 
Probably the most influential among the American legal realists 
working with the example of choice-of-law method was Walter 
Wheeler Cook.8 Cook argued that, whatever law a court said it was 
choosing, however much a court seemed to be subordinating its own 
law, a court always, in fact, applied its own local law and policy. 
5. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934). 
6. Cf. The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 432 (1922) (Holmes, J.). 
7. Cf Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 ( 1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting): "The 
decision will depend on a judgment or intuition more subtle than any articulate major 
premise." 
8. See generally WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE 
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942); Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the 
Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L. J. 457 (1924). 
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Otherwise it would not have chosen the law that it did choose. Cook 
saw that a departure from local law was as much an expression of 
actual local policy as an application of local law. He saw that a 
departure from the law of the forum on ostensible choice-of-law 
grounds is really a change in the forum's substantive policy. He saw 
how the change becomes apparent to the bench and bar in later cases, 
as lawyers begin to argue that the supposed law of the forum has 
become an inaccurate reflection of true forum policy - as evidenced 
by the forum's recent departure from its own law. This was Cook's 
"local law" theory.9 
Cook came to such thinking by looking beyond the lifeless 
abstractions of the traditional choice-of-law method to its results. He 
saw that legal formalisms, unless manipulated instrumentally, are all 
too likely to produce arbitrary and irrational decisions. The more 
principled the application, the more arbitrary the result. Cook and the 
other American legal realists disparaged the alleged virtues of 
mechanical jurisprudence - neutrality, predictability, uniformity. 
Their concern, rather, was with the flesh-and-blood men and women 
for whom too often the casualty of abstraction is justice. 
B. The Supreme Court 
We have to look to the Supreme Court for the second strand in 
this intellectual history. In a series of otherwise uninteresting cases in 
the 1930s, the Court began to test choices of law as it does today, 
under the Due Process Clause. The question for the Court was 
whether a particular choice of law was so arbitrary and irrational as to 
deprive the parties of the process that is due. In the now-classic Home 
Insurance Co. v. Dick, the Court held in 1 930, in an opinion by Justice 
Brandeis, that the law of a state without any relevant connection with 
a case could not rationally, and therefore could not constitutionally, 
govern that case.10 To exercise lawmaking power, a state should have 
some nexus, some physical contact, with the case its law is supposed to 
govern. 
As this idea developed, the Court began to see that a mere 
physical contact, by itself, might not be sufficient. Rather, the fact of a 
state's physical contact with a case was important only because it lay a 
basis for a more salient question: Did the state, by virtue of its physical 
contact with a case, have a rational basis for the application of its law? 
In other words, was the contact significant, for purposes of establishing 
constitutional power? Might the state's physical contact with a case 
9. See David F. Cavers, The Two "Local Law" Theories, 63 HARV. L. REV. 822 (1950). 
10. Horne Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). For the continuing controversy over Mr. 
Dick's connections with the forum or lack thereof, see, e.g., Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Who Was 
Dick? Constitutional Limitations on State Choice of Law, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 37. 
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reasonably be thought to give rise to some legitimate interest in 
governing it? The place of injury seemed a significant contact in a tort 
case. The place where the lawyers resided did not.11 
Of course there are at least two putatively concerned states in 
every conflicts case. The concern of each is suggested by some physical 
contact between the case and the state. This being so, the Supreme 
Court began to see that both states might have constitutional power. 
For example, the law chosen in a multistate case of tort, when there 
was a contractual relation between the parties, could be either the law 
of the place of injury or the law of the place of contracting - as the 
Court specifically held, by Justice Stone, in 1939.1 2  The foundation for 
this insight had been laid in an earlier opinion, also by Justice Stone, 13 
when, in 1935, the Supreme Court decided the watershed case of 
Alaska Packers v. Industrial Accident Commission. 14 In Alaska 
Packers, the Court began the long process of weaning the bar from its 
conviction (still an article of faith with some lawyers today) that in a 
two-state case, American courts are required by the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause to defer to the law of the other state. In fact, there is no 
obligation of full faith and credit to a sister state's laws - as opposed 
to a sister state's judgments 15 - and in Alaska Packers Justice Stone 
11. But see Haag v. Barnes, 175 N.E.2d 441, 444 (N.Y. 1961) (listing a lawyer's domicile 
as among the "contacts" which, in the aggregate, were held to support a departure from 
forum law). 
12. Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Cornrn'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939) (Stone, J.). 
13. For Justice Stone's contributions to the field of conflict of laws, see generally Paul A. 
Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1210 (1946), 
reprinted in PAUL A. FREUND, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 183 (1968). 
14. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Indus. Accident Cornrn'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935). 
15. Id. at 547. With a single modem exception not relevant here, it is only with respect 
to state judgments that Congress has exercised its power, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, to require 
full faith and credit. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11,  1 Stat. 122, codified as amended at 28 
U.S.C. § 1738: "And the said records and judicial proceedings authenticated as aforesaid, 
shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States, as they 
have by law or usage in the courts of the state from whence the said records are or shall be 
taken." Under this statute, the forum must give the same scope to a state judgment that the 
judgment-rendering state would. See also § 1738(a) (requiring full faith and credit to custody 
decrees). See also Marrese v. Arn. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373 (1985) 
(O'Connor, J.) (requiring federal courts, even in federal-question cases, to measure the 
scope of a state judgment as the judgment-rendering state would, at least in the first 
instance. Only after ascertaining whether the state judgment, so construed, would conflict 
with federal law should a federal court consider whether an exception should be made). The 
modem statutory exception to the rule that full faith and credit applies only to judgments 
appears in the Defense of Marriage Act, Act of Sept. 21, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 1 10 Stat. 
2419, codified in pertinent part at 28 U.S.C. § 1738(c). Disregarding the historical difference 
between judgments and laws, Professor Maltz proposes that we view the problem of 
recognition of sister-state judgments merely as a conflict of laws, specifically a conflict of 
"procedural" rules. Earl M. Maltz, The Full Faith and Credit Clause and the First 
Restatement: The Place of Baker v. General Motors Corp. in Choice of Law Theory, 73 TuL. 
L. REV. 305 (1998). He argues that since procedure is traditionally governed by forum law, 
forum law should govern the validity of a sister-state judgment. It is the least of this 
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was at some pains to explain that there could be no such obligation. If 
the obligation of full faith and credit attached to laws, we would have 
what Stone called an "absurd" result. In cases in which the laws of two 
states were in conflict, the forum would have to apply the laws of the 
other state, but would be disabled from applying its own.16 Perhaps 
Stone saw this result as "absurd" because it would obliterate the 
common law of choice of law. Or perhaps it was absurd to him 
because it would flout the will of the legislature at the forum in every 
two-state case. Or perhaps because it would strip a court of power to 
enforce the substantive law of its own state. I suspect, though, that 
Justice Stone thought it "absurd" simply because of the oddity of the 
crisscross arrangement, by which each of the two states would have to 
rely on the other to furnish law for a case. I am reminded of the old 
story, intended to be uplifting, of the villagers suddenly afflicted with a 
malady of which the only symptom is stiff arms. Unable to feed 
themselves, they are about to perish from starvation, when they are 
saved by the inspired realization that they can feed each other. 
Fortunately, after Alaska Packers, it has become clear that the 
obligation of full faith and credit requires no such contortions. Full 
faith and credit has to do with a sister state's judgments, not its laws. 
The Court still has occasion to reiterate this lesson, as it did in 2003 
in Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt.11 There, Justice O'Connor, writing 
for the Court, pointed out that the Court's body of precedent 
"differentiates the credit owed to laws ... and to judgments."18 To be 
sure, some constitutional conflicts cases are still argued under the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause. But the Supreme Court treats such cases as if 
argued under the Due Process Clause. In Hyatt, California's lawyers 
did rely on the Full Faith and Credit Clause, possibly out of concern 
that the state and its tax board might not be "persons" entitled to due 
process of law.19 The Hyatt Court accordingly confined its opinion to 
proposal's disadvantages that it would require repeal of the Act of 1790, supra. More 
fundamentally, the proposal would deny full faith and credit to the sister-state judgment, 
whittling it down or puffing it up to match the forum's ideas. This would be subversive of the 
intention of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, to unite American courts, short of 
nationalizing them, as a single juridical entity. 
16. "A rigid and literal enforcement of the full faith and credit clause, without regard to 
the statute of the forum, would lead to the absurd result that, wherever the conflict arises, 
the statute of each state must be enforced in the courts of the other, but cannot be in its 
own." Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. at 547 (Stone, J.). 
17. 538 U.S. 488 (2003). 
18. Id. at 494. 
19. I am indebted to Marty Lederman for pointing out that in South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323-24 (1966), the Court stated, "The word 'person' in the context 
of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment cannot, by any reasonable mode of 
interpretation, be expanded to encompass the States of the Union, and to our knowledge 
this has never been done by any court." It would indeed seem rather odd to construe the 
"person" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment as embracing a state, since the 
Amendment protects persons against the state. Nevertheless it would seem at least equally 
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the question California raised under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 
Nevertheless, the Court referred throughout to due process cases. 
The innovative Supreme Court cases of the 1930s taught that in a 
two-state case in tort, the law chosen did not have to be the law of the 
place of injury, nor, in a contract case, did it have to be the law of the 
place of contracting - nor, indeed, any other single place. In cases 
combining tort and contract elements, both places would have 
constitutional power. This liberating insight in interstate cases carried 
over to the ordinary common-law sphere of the Court's own choice-of­
law method in federal, transnational cases. Thus, in dealing with 
international choices of law in admiralty, a later Supreme Court, in 
Lauritzen v. Larsen, as a matter of federal common law, jettisoned 
tradition and enumerated various contacts between countries and a 
case that might be significant for choice-of-law purposes.20 Today the 
leading modern due process cases are Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague21 
and Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts.22 Under these cases the Court 
requires that the law chosen to govern an issue be the law of a state 
having sufficient "contacts" with an issue to generate state "interests" 
in governance of that issue. These interests must be sufficient to 
ensure that application of the chosen law will be neither "arbitrary" 
nor "fundamentally unfair."23 
For a deeper understanding we now need to turn to the third 
strand in the story. 
C. The Advent of Interest Analysis 
Nothing in the intellectual history of the American conflicts 
revolution was of greater moment than the publication of a law review 
article some still consider the greatest law review article ever written, 
Brainerd Currie's Married Women's Contracts.24 In the American 
odd that a state as litigant should not be entitled to ordinary due process in either set of 
courts. The remark in Katzenbach seems doubtful vis-a-vis the process due the litigating 
state. 
20. 345 U.S. 571, 581-93 (1953). Lauritzen, although a great advance for its time, is less 
helpful today. It survives in admiralty. 
21. 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981). 
22. 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985), quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 
(1981). 
23. Hague, 449 U.S. at 312-13 (Brennan, J.): "[F]or a State's substantive law to be 
selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must have a significant contact 
or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is 
neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." 
24. Brainerd Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 
25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227 (1958), reprinted in BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE 
CONFLICT OF LAWS 77 (1963). 
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conflicts revolution, this would become the shot heard round the 
world. 
Currie began modestly enough by stating a case - a familiar 
American classic of the field, the 1873 case of Millikin v. Pratt.25 In 
that case, Mr. Pratt of Massachusetts, trying to embark on a new 
business venture involving goods shipped from Maine, prevailed on 
his wife to guarantee his payments to his Maine supplier, the Milliken 
company. Mr. Pratt, putting his wife's separate property at risk, posted 
her complaisantly signed guarantee in a mailbox in Massachusetts. 
Times were hard and Pratt's new venture went awry. When the Pratts 
failed to pay, Milliken came down to Massachusetts to sue Mrs. Pratt 
on her guarantee. The Pratts defended on the ground that, under the 
law of Massachusetts in effect when Mrs. Pratt signed that piece of 
paper (repealed shortly thereafter), married women had no capacity 
to contract. Under the law of Maine, however, Mrs. Pratt's guarantee 
was good. Maine had long ago disembarrassed itself of a rule denying 
married women the capacity to contract. 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts famously held for 
the Maine creditor. Chief Justice Gray decided that the law of the 
place of contracting must govern a contract case in its entirety, even 
on the issue of capacity. He rejected the law of the domicile to govern 
the capacity of its domiciliaries, although that was a standard choice at 
the time. But where was the place of contracting? Gray manipulatively 
identified the place of contracting as Maine, thus validating the 
interstate agreement and holding Mrs. Pratt to her promise. In other 
words, Massachusetts' highest court denied a Massachusetts resident 
the protections of Massachusetts law, invalidating a Massachusetts 
married woman's contract signed by her in Massachusetts, in order to 
allow a nonresident creditor to collect. 
Much has been written on all sides of this troubling but admired 
case. Dispute still rages between territorialists and modernists; 
between equalizing feminists and protecting feminists; between those 
who think the mailbox rule for formation of contracts should 
determine the place of contracting for choice-of-law purposes and 
those who do not see why it should; between those who think 
Massachusetts' intervening repeal probably made the difference and 
those who think, if so, the court was wrong to let it affect the case 
retroactively; between proponents of lex domicilii and proponents of 
lex loci contractus; between advocates of the issue-by-issue approach26 
25. Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1878) (holding that the law of the place of 
contracting determines the validity of a contract even on the issue of capacity to contract, an 
issue that had been supposed governed by the law of the domicile). 
26. The rational breakdown of whole "cases" into "issues" - the technique of so-called 
depei;age - was a somewhat later development, itself controversial, and one that occurred 
only gradually in the interplay between courts and writers. Depei;age was at the heart of the 
question presented by Milliken v. Pratt, since the capacity of a married woman to contract 
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and advocates of one law for the whole case; and between champions 
of forum law and defenders of interstate commerce. 27 But Currie had 
bigger fish to fry. 
The tack Currie took was simply to chart all sixteen possible 
permutations of Milliken v. Pratt by allocating either to Maine or 
Massachusetts each of the four main "contacts" in the case (Mrs. 
Pratt's domicile, Milliken's place of incorporation, the place of trial, 
and the place of contracting). He then charted the traditional 
outcomes to be expected in all these possible Mi/likens - outcomes, in 
other words, under the law of the place of contracting. Then, in two 
tables, Currie compared those outcomes with identifiable policies of 
the concerned states. With these simple materials, building on the 
great American legal realist writings in the field, and under the 
influence, as he freely acknowledged, of the Supreme Court cases of 
the 1930s, Currie showed us astonishing truths about conflicts cases, 
things which had not previously been understood. 
The Supreme Court had helped us to see that the law of a state 
having no connection with a case was an irrational choice; and that the 
law of the place of injury in a tort case, or of the place of contracting in 
a contract case, were not necessarily the only rational choices. Married 
Women's Contracts showed us that the laws of states with even those 
traditional connections with a case were not necessarily rational 
choices at all. The law of the place of contracting might not be 
rationally applicable in a particular contract case. The law of the place 
of injury might not be rationally applicable in a particular case of tort. 
In other words, a state's physical contact with a case might not matter. 
A state's contact with a case needed to be significant. It would not be 
significant, Currie argued, unless the relevant policies and interests of 
that state would be advanced by application of its actual law to the 
actual facts of the particular case. 
Devising a revolutionary mode of analysis, Currie was able 
convincingly to determine the significance of a physical contact. Currie 
called his new method "governmental interest analysis." He thought 
this analysis implicit in the Supreme Court cases of the 1930s. Readers 
familiar with constitutional litigation will also see the further analogy 
between the interest analysis the Supreme Court uses in interstate 
conflicts cases under the Due Process Clause and the interest analysis 
the Court uses in substantive constitutional cases. In both settings, a 
burden falls on one of the parties to show that the state has some 
was arguably a question more appropriately addressed to her domicile than to the place of 
contracting. In Milliken, Chief Justice Gray declined to break out the issue of capacity. This 
had the effect of furthering his instrumentalist purpose of validating the interstate contract. 
27. For my views on Milliken v. Pratt, see Louise Weinberg, A Structural Revision of the 
Conflicts Restatement, 75 IND. L. J. 475, 494-96 (2000). 
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rational basis for the application of its laws - a legitimate 
governmental interest. (In constitutional cases warranting heightened 
scrutiny of state action, the burden becomes one of showing a 
compelling governmental interest, but the principle is the same.) 
Interestingly, as in the conflicts cases, these burdens in the substantive 
cases also trace to the 1930s, also to an opinion by Justice Stone. The 
case, of course, was Carolene Products.28 
By trying to identify a legitimate governmental interest at the place 
of contracting for each of his charted variants of Milliken v. Pratt, 
Currie demonstrated that the one physical contact between a state and 
a lawsuit that courts took most seriously in choosing law - the place 
of the underlying events - was a place that in a large fraction of 
conflicts cases had no interest at all in having its law applied. Even 
such interests as might rationally be attributable to the state of 
transaction or occurrence were at best only very general. The obvious 
implication of this demonstration was that a court's choice, for 
example, of the law of the place of injury to govern a tort, however 
conventional, however traditional, however reassuring, however 
hallowed by time and confident usage, was likely to be as irrational a 
choice as the law of a state having nothing to do with the case at all. 
This was a startling conclusion. How did interest analysis yield 
such counterintuitive ideas? Concerning cases of personal injury, for 
example, Currie reasoned that the interests of all states as potential 
places of injury lay in maintaining safety. A state would tend to be 
focused on deterring accidents and maintaining the safety of its 
territory, having no interest in maintaining an unsafe territory. 
Accidents are costly, calling on state resources for expenditures 
exceeding those entailed in maintaining safety. A state would have a 
general interest, therefore, in deterring torts within its borders. 
Moreover, a state would not want to discourage commercial or other 
visitors by maintaining unsafe conditions on its territory, and would 
want to encourage such visitors by protecting them. The state, 
therefore, would have general interests in compensating anyone 
injured within its borders, residents and visitors alike. Only if its law 
was defendant-deterring or plaintiff-favoring, then, could the law of the 
place of injury, qua place of injury, rationally apply in a case of 
personal injuries. Of course legislatures do enact defendant-protecting 
laws, and, of course, courts do fashion defendant-protecting rules. The 
place of injury might well have general defendant-protecting law, or 
28. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (Stone, J.) (sustaining 
an act of Congress regulating imitation milk on the ground that Congress need only have 
some rational basis for enacting ordinary economic legislation); id. at 152 n.4 (reserving a 
power of heightened scrutiny for cases of failure of the political process, violations of 
fundamental rights, or discriminations against discrete and insular minorities). I argue the 
link between governmental interest analysis and rational-basis review in Louise Weinberg, 
Choice of Law and Minimal Scrutiny, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 440 (1982). 
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specific enterprise-protecting law. And, of course, such law would 
have its rational applications, exceptions to the state's more general 
safety concerns. But those rational applications would be limited to 
cases in which the place of injury was also the place where the 
defendant resided, or where the enterprise was located or the relevant 
acts were performed or relevant products were being made. In other 
words, the state's interest in protecting tort defendants would not arise 
from the fact that the injury occurred there, but rather from the fact 
that the defendant was based there or conducting relevant activities 
there. 
Similarly, all states have general interests in maintaining the 
validity of legitimate business transactions within their borders. A 
place where an agreement is formed,29 assuming no other contact with 
a case, can have no interest in discrediting the transaction unless it is a 
violation of public policy. A state would tend, rather, to be focused on 
encouraging business within its borders. The state, therefore, would 
have a general interest in sustaining the validity of a contract formed 
there, and thus in compensating any creditor who suffered a loss on 
account of a breach of a contract formed there. Only if its law was 
validating or plaintiff-favoring (that is, creditor-favoring), then, could 
the law of the place of contracting, qua place of contracting, rationally 
apply in a case of breach. Of course, legislatures do enact debtor­
protecting laws, and, of course, courts do fashion debtor-protecting 
rules. The place of contracting might well have debtor-protecting, 
contract-invalidating law. And, of course, such law would have its 
rational applications, exceptions to the state's more general validating 
concerns. But those rational applications would be limited to cases in 
which the place of contracting was also a place relevant to such an 
application, like the place where the debtor resided. In other words, 
the state's interest in protecting contract defendants did not arise from 
the fact that the contract was formed there, but rather from the fact 
that the defendant was based there or conducting valuable activities 
there. 
Interest analysis is an imperishable contribution to the rational 
application of law. Yet interest analysis, as Currie insisted, was only, 
at bottom, ordinary statutory construction and ordinary interpreta­
tion of case law. One learns in the first year of law school that law 
has no application beyond the limits of its own likely purposes -
that rules have no force beyond the scope of the reasons for them.30 
29. For the limited purposes of the present discussion, I have refrained from considering 
the traditional alternative to the place of contracting, the place of performance. 
30. Cf Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.) ("Those 
who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If 
two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each."); Calder 
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So lawyers tend to look for the reasons for a rule - to argue 
purposively, functionally. But somehow lawyers had not made 
ordinary construction and interpretation a part of the choice-of-law 
process. While lawyers, judges, and commentators were accustomed to 
analyzing substantive issues by inquiring into the reason for a law, 
they were also accustomed to rigid, territorial, formalistic choices of 
law - choices made without regard to law's reason, based on fixed 
traditional rules of the sort set down in the First Restatement. They 
were not unaware of the realist critique of the traditional way of 
choosing law, but it still seemed to them that, rational or not, the 
traditional rules were better than a stab in the dark. However 
manipulable the traditional rules were proving to be, at least they gave 
the illusion of providing neutral, certain, predictable, and uniform 
choices. Married Women's Contracts met this seductive thinking head 
on. Currie knew that the supposedly fixed rules could be putty 
in judicial hands. He doubted that the traditional rules were capable 
of uniform application. But even supposing that they were, Currie 
argued that the price of uniformity was too high.31 Under careful 
interest analysis, Currie conclusively demonstrated that a principled 
application of the old territorial rules would chronically thwart the 
policy of one of the two states without advancing any policy of the 
other. 
Pressing on, Currie then demonstrated something even more 
unexpected, something that could not have been understood without 
interest analysis. Suddenly it was revealed to his astonished readers 
that a large number of the possible Mi/likens on the chart in which the 
laws of the two states were in conflict were what Currie called "false 
conflicts." In these cases, notwithstanding that the laws of the two 
states did seem to conflict, only one of the two states was an 
"interested" one. Only one of the two had law that could rationally 
govern the particular situation. These were cases of false conflict 
because only one of the two states had a dog in the fight. This 
identification of false conflicts was a revelation, a major discovery.32 
Currie topped this with another major discovery, equally obvious, 
yet something we had not seen because we had not recognized false 
conflicts before Married Women's Contracts. The obvious solution of a 
false conflict is to apply the law of the only interested state. This alone, 
Currie pointed out, would solve a large fraction of conflicts cases. 
v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798) (Chase, J.) ("The nature, and ends of legislative power 
will limit the exercise of it."). 
· 
31. Currie, Married Women's Contracts, supra note 24, at 101. 
32. The mistaken belief persists that the technical term "false conflict" is intended to 
describe cases in which there is no conflict because the laws of both concerned states are the 
same. See, for a typical example, Brenner v. Oppenheimer & Co., 44 P.3d 364, 373 (Kan. 
2002) ,  as later edited citing Lucker Mfg. v. Home Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 808, 813 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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Today, regardless of the choice methods adopted, a fair number of 
American courts try to identify and eliminate false conflicts to obviate 
any necessity for a more complex choice-of-law process. 
Using interest analysis, Currie also was able to identify "true 
conflicts." These were cases like the real Milliken v. Pratt, in which 
each of the two states was an "interested" one, in the sense that either 
state's laws could rationally (and constitutionally) apply. And in other 
early work he would also identify the "unprovided-for case," the case 
in which neither state has a legitimate governmental interest.33 
Currie had shown how to identify and resolve false conflicts.  But 
his true conflicts and unprovided-for cases presented problems he 
believed could not be solved. For both these intractable kinds of 
conflicts he suggested as a default position that the forum fall back on 
its own law. No doubt it helped, in reaching this conclusion for true 
conflict cases, that Alaska Packers had held the forum to be under no 
obligation of full faith and credit to apply the other state's law. 
As for unprovided-for cases, the forum, having j urisdiction over the 
case and the parties, would have sufficient administrative interest by 
virtue of those facts to make its law available as residual law, a more 
clearly constitutional choice, Currie thought, than a choice of the 
other state's law. 
D. The State Courts 
Meanwhile, concurrent with the interest-analysis revolution, there 
was a fourth development in this intellectual history: the state courts 
were jumping in. The courts began to contribute creatively to the 
demolition of the past and to proposals for modern approaches. Chief 
Judge Stanley H. Fuld in New York chased the chimera of a 
discernible "center of gravity" of a case,34 and Chief Justice Roger 
Traynor in California began to use analyses of the policies and 
interests of the concerned states.35 Traynor brought a characteristic 
accommodationist perspective to his conflicts cases. In cases of true 
conflict, he typically wound up subordinating California's interests to 
those of sister states, or of the interstate system itself, as 
Massachusetts' Chief Justice Gray had famously done in Milliken v. 
33. See Brainerd Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the 
Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. REV. 205 (1958). Currie used the word "unprovided" without 
the added "-for." 
34. See Haag v. Barnes, 175 N.E.2d 441, 444 (N.Y. 1961); Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 
99, 101 (N.Y. 1954). 
35. See, e.g. , Grant v. McAuliffe, 264 P.2d 944 (Cal. 1953) (en bane). 
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['ratt.36 Eventually Traynor would propose an influential "comparative 
impairment" model for resolution of true conflicts.37 
II. THE POLITICS OF CONFLICTS 
Anticlimactically, now that the dust has settled, it appears that 
modernism has not won out after all. Although Brainerd Currie's 
work will always stand at some pinnacle of legal thought, in these 
postmodern times the American conflicts revolution churns on 
unendingly, like the war in George Orwell's 1984. 
The Second Restatement, triumphantly displacing the discredited 
First Restatement in 1971,38 and now adopted in the great majority of 
American jurisdictions, has turned out to be a disappointment.39 To be 
sure, the Second Restatement presents a somewhat progressive far;ade. 
It appears to abandon the place of injury, the place of contracting, and 
so forth, relying instead upon the place of "most significant contact."40 
It is also true that its key overarching section affords courts an 
opportunity to consider the policies and interests of the concerned 
states.41 But it surrenders much of this ground in the specific 
provisions it makes for different areas of substantive law. These 
specific sections make presumptive choices of the old, rigid, 
territorialist, formalistic rules. Dishearteningly, the law of the place of 
injury still presumptively governs a tort; the law of the place of 
contracting still presumptively governs a contract.42 These are 
36. See, e.g. , Bernkrant v. Fowler, 360 P.2d 906 (1961) (en bane). For my analysis of 
Bernkrant, see Louise Weinberg, On Departing from Forum Law, 35 MERCER L. REV. 595, 
609-12 (1984). 
37. See Herma Hill Kay, The Use of Comparative Impairment To Resolve True Conflicts: ' 
An Evaluation of the California Experience, 68 CAL. L. REv. 577 (1980); William F. Baxter, 
Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1963). 
38. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971). 
39. On the vices and virtues of Restatement (Second), see, for example, Friedrich K. 
Juenger, A Third Conflicts Restatement?, 75 IND. L. J. 403 (2000); Symeon C. Symeonides, 
The Judicial Acceptance of the Second Conflicts Restatement: A Mixed Blessing, 56 MD. L. 
REV. 1248 (1997); Weinberg, A Structural Revision, supra note 27; Russell J. Weintraub, "At 
Least, To Do No Harm": Does the Second Restatement of Conflicts Meet the Hippocratic 
Standard?, 56 MD. L. REV. 1284 (1997); see also William L. Reynolds, The Silver Anniversary 
of the Second Conflicts Restatement, 56 MD. L. REV. 1193 (1997). 
40. Currie did not think it possible to rank-order contacts. To him, the word "most" in 
the phrase "most significant contact" would have been puzzling. After one has read enough 
cases, one has to agree with Currie on this. Courts leap to a conclusion about "the place of 
most significant contact" by piling up "contacts," or by creative use of the all-purpose 
judicial term, "We think." 
41. The reference is to the list of general guidelines found in section 6 of Restatement 
(Second). 
42. For an intellectual history of Restatement (Second), reconstructing the likely 
intentions of Willis Reese, its distinguished Reporter, see Weinberg, A Structural Revision, 
supra note 27. 
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presumed to be the places of "most significant contact," although by 
now everyone who has read Married Women's Contracts knows that 
these places are likely to be of no more significance, and probably less, 
than the respective residences of the parties. 
Meanwhile, modem conflicts theory has become ensnarled in 
unending, heated debate between traditionalists and modernists, those 
who favor rules and those who favor "approaches," and between the 
vociferous critics of interest analysis and its defenders. There also 
lingers a methodological debate over how to solve the problems 
Currie was unable to solve. The courts went through a period of these 
kinds of debate as well, but, just as the academic debate has not 
produced a decisive triumph of reason, the judicial debate has not 
produced a decisive triumph of justice. By now, most state courts, and 
virtually all federal courts, have opted for the Second Restatement, 
with a predictably large quotient of arbitrary and unjust results. 
To make matters worse, the contending academic factions have 
become increasingly politicized. In conflicts of tort law, methods that 
tend to yield plaintiff-favoring law are thought to be favored by 
liberals, methods that tend to yield defendant-protecting law by 
conservatives. Nobody likes to say this, but there it is. Choices that 
yield forum law are considered parochial, and because the plaintiff 
chooses the forum, choices of forum law are decried as plaintiff­
oriented. Choices that extend comity to the (usually) defendant­
favoring law of a sister state43 are considered illiberal, unjust, and 
defense-oriented. Because traditional territorialist methods are at 
least superficially "neutral," striking with even-handed ferocity now at 
plaintiffs, now at defendants (and because, by nature, conservatives 
are comfortable with things familiar), conservatives tend to favor 
"rules." Liberals, on the other hand, are unnerved by the mere 
contemplation of ferocity, evenhanded or not. They tend to feel more 
comfortable with "approaches." The interest analysts' typical 
preoccupation with the states in which the parties are based is 
considered unprincipled by conservatives; and the forum preference 
characteristic of interest analysis is thought unacceptably indulgent to 
the plaintiff and the parochial, selfish state. 
III. AN EMPIRICAL TuRN 
Dean Symeonides is one of the more tolerant and patient voices 
in these ongoing controversies. Whether he is explaining the ways 
43. Non-forum law tends to be defendant-favoring because the plaintiff has the choice 
of forum. 
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of Europeans to Americans,44 or, as here, explaining the ways of 
Americans to Europeans, or simply thinking about American conflicts 
law, he has played a fundamentally optimistic and healing part. He 
is adept in modern methods, and at the same time a hopeful advocate 
for a return to rule-based choices. His codifications, for all that they 
are codifications, bear the impress of modern thinking. Other great 
writers in the field, the late Robert Leflar, Elliot Cheatham, Willis 
Reese, and David Cavers, struggled to find sets of general "principles" 
as guidelines to choosing law, as has my esteemed colleague, Russell 
Weintraub. But none of these writers sought to go back to the future. 
Nor were any of them interested in the retrograde project of detailed 
codification. All were realists, not formalists. Symeonides is much 
more conservative than those writers. But he is more respectful of 
counter-arguments than other conservatives. In this way, he has 
become something of an enigma - a man of mystery. Where does he 
stand? Is he in the defendants' corner, with the other conservatives? 
Does his acknowledgement of the advances made by the interest 
analysts push him into the plaintiffs' corner, with the modernists and 
liberals? Does his concern for justice do so? Or, like D avid Cavers, his 
avowed idol, is he seeking the elusive holy grail of conflicts neutrality? 
Perhaps the greatest pleasure the reader will take in The American 
Choice-of-Law Revolution will derive from the access it affords to 
Symeonides' innermost thinking. For although his book opens as a 
simple descriptive record organized along standard familiar lines, it 
quickly leaves the familiar behind and becomes an extended internal 
dialogue. 
This may seem all the more surprising because Symeonides is, first 
and foremost, a phenomenologist. The reader unfamiliar with his 
other recent work will be struck by the turn toward empiricism 
manifest in The American Choice-of-Law Revolution on virtually 
every page. Writers in the field have been calling for an "empirical 
turn,"45 and, whether or not they were influenced by Symeonides' 
earlier work, Symeonides has taken that turn here. By this I mean 
much more than that he has consulted cases in the usual 
commentator's way. The American Choice-of-Law Revolution is 
veritably lit up with charts, diagrams and tables; and it is not simply 
illumined by these materials, but argued closely from them. 
44. See, e.g. , Symeon C. Symeonides, The Mixed Legal System of the Republic of Cyprus, 
78 TuL. L. REV. 441 (2003). 
45. See, e.g. , William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Prolegomenon - to an 
Empirical Restatement of Conflicts, 75 IND. L. J. 417 (2000). See also, e.g., Ralph U. Whitten, 
U.S. Conflict-of-Laws Doctrine and Forum Shopping, International and Domestic 
(Revisited), 37 TEX. INT'L L. J. 559 (2002); Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice-of-law 
Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 350 (1992). 
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One thinks at once of Brainerd Currie's powerful tabular 
representations of conflicts cases, their variants and outcomes. But 
Currie needed to provide only a very few tables to make his points, 
and to make Currie's points casebooks today need use only two or 
three of those tables, edited to weed out Currie's occasional mistakes. 
Others have also made useful contributions through visual 
representations. William Richman, for example, working in Ohio, 
built on interest analysis to devise a novel technique of analyzing 
conflicts cases through diagramming them.46 Richman's analytic 
diagrams have been remarkably successful in conveying to successor 
generations the interest-analytic way of thinking. But these sorts of 
materials are visualizations of abstract legal theory. Dean Symeonides' 
tables perform quite different functions. 
The tables in The American Choice-of-Law Revolution are far 
more concerned with actual cases in the courts than with theoretical 
abstractions. Symeonides limits his field of observation to cases of tort, 
the setting for most choice-of-law litigation. To these cases he brings 
an overarching, almost sociological perspective, with something like 
a political scientist's interest in discerning patterns. How is the 
outcome of a tort case related to the choice-of-law method employed? 
How does this relationship fare for different case patterns? 
Symeonides separates joint-domicile cases from split-domicile cases. 
He tabulates cases in which the forum has one, then two, then three 
significant contacts with a case. He plots cases in which a state has 
defendant-affiliating contacts against cases in which a state has 
plaintiff-affiliating contacts. He charts these sorts of things for true 
conflicts, false conflicts, and unprovided-for cases, noting, in an 
interest-analytic way, which of the two parties the particular law 
favors. He looks at different substantive fields of tort law, cases in 
which "conduct-regulating" rules are at issue and cases in which "loss­
allocating rules" are at issue. His rich graphical resources, then, are 
deployed to capture and put within our grasp the results of important 
and multidimensional empirical inquiries. 
All this is in aid of a most interesting mission. As might be 
expected from a codifier of conflicts law, Symeonides remains strongly 
predisposed toward the relative security of rules. In his persuasive, 
characteristically evenhanded way, he argues the case forcefully for 
well-considered choice rules. He is not overly concerned to describe or 
defend the rules he has enshrined in the Louisiana Code. His 
references to them are for the most part couched in generalities. His 
concern throughout this book, rather, is in the empirical question: 
How are conflicts cases actually playing out in the courts? He offers 
46. See William M. Richman, Graphic Forms in Conflict of Laws, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 
631 (1996); William M. Richman, Diagramming Conflicts, 43 OHIO ST. L. J. 317 (1982). 
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more than analysis or commentary; he offers synthesis. He is not so 
much interested in inventing solutions and then proposing and 
advocating them - the usual path of conflicts theorists - as he is in 
changing our minds about the sources of rule-based solutions. He is 
not interested in devising rules. Rather, he wants to derive them. 
This, he tells us, was the method he employed in authoring the 
Louisiana conflicts code. All the charts, tables, diagrams - and the 
thinking that went into them and is gleaned from them - are there to 
furnish the raw material of rules of choice of tort law. Dean 
Symeonides deals with commonplace cases, a good many of them, 
remarkably current cases, a collection of well-realized materials more 
interesting and varied than can be found elsewhere. His ambition is to 
put in rule form what courts actually do. The American Law 
Institute's Restatements purport to do something of the sort; but they 
tend, in the end, to be both discriminating and reforming. Moreover, 
no massive phenomenological inquiries go into a Restatement. 
Typically, a few leading cases appear as supporting references in a 
Reporter's Notes. But Dean Symeonides acts on the principle that 
what courts do, and their measure of agreement in what they do, are 
phenomena to be taken very seriously indeed. Symeonides has the 
strong conviction that to glean truth from reality one has to handle a 
great deal of reality, and to do so with utmost care. 
Nor is Symeonides' idea that of most other writers, to change what 
courts are doing. Like the late Professor Albert Ehrenzweig, he has 
come to feel instead that - whatever courts say they are doing - they 
will tend to gravitate toward established patterns of choice of law. 
These, Ehrenzweig thought, were the "true rules."47 Of course, the 
task of gleaning principles from cases is familiar to every student of 
the common law. But Symeonides' work, like Ehrenzweig's, stands as 
something of a reproach to the rest of us. We have been so concerned 
with abstract "rules" ahd formal "approaches" that we have not been 
doing the common lawyer's job. We have been so busy teaching the 
judges that we have not been learning from them. As for those whose 
writing has also taken an empirical turn, Symeonides'  work may 
suggest to them that their samples have been too small, their 
categories too careless, the number of their categories too limited, 
their inquiries too scattershot and disorganized. No legal realist could 
shrug off Dean Symeonides' "rules" as mere abstractions. Concededly, 
the kinds of rules he is proposing would be too complex, layered, 
many-sided, to be true rules themselves, and, concededly, they would 
47. See ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 465 (1962); 
Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Choice of Law: Current Doctrine and "True Rules," 49 CAL. L. REV. 
240 (1961). Ehrenzweig argued, for example, that in choosing law to determine the validity 
of contracts, the "true rule" manifest in judicial opinions was not "the law of the place of 
contracting," but rather a "rule of validation." EHRENZWEIG, TREATISE, supra, at 465. 
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be tempered by some sensitive modernist tweaking. But they would 
build on true rules. The American Choice-of-Law Revolution argues 
that the choice-of-law process needs rules, but the rules it is talking 
about would give the courts the guidance, as seen in an improving 
mirror, of their own reflection. 
This mirror for magistrates would, indeed, be an improving one. It 
is a notable feature of the book, accounting for not a little of its depth 
and dimensionality, that Symeonides, conservative as he is, is also 
confessedly and not ungratefully dependent on the basic insights and 
concepts of the interest analysts. To be sure, this kind of pragmatic, 
matured traditionalism is not unique to Symeonides. Interest analysis 
has been incorporated into all the modem methods in some degree. 
With few exceptions, even the least temperate of its critics no longer 
resists thinking and speaking interest-analytically. In short, interest 
analysis is the very language of contemporary conflicts theory, and 
although few courts can be said to have adopted it in any formal way, 
it often furnishes the language of courts that have formally adopted 
some other technique. Dean Symeonides, too, resorts to the 
vocabulary and methods of interest analysis, not only in wrestling with 
the contending modern theories, or in surveying fields of case law, but 
even when advocating a return to choice rules. Unhampered by 
ideological wrath in a very politicized field, Symeonides accepts and is 
content with the modern American framework for debate. 
IV. IRRATIONAL AND DISCRIMINATORY CHOICES 
From his empirical inquiries Symeonides discovers some rather 
surprising facts. We learn that consideration of policies and interests is 
not producing the disproportionate plaintiff victories that critics of 
interest analysis predicted - perhaps because a good number of 
judges never did get the hang of interest analysis. Nor do decisions 
that are interest-analytic exhibit the forum bias that Brainerd Currie 
thought made the best sense and that so exasperates his critics. As for 
the Second Restatement, although Dean Symeonides adjudges it at 
best a "mixed blessing,"48 it has not led to disproportionate plaintiff 
victories either. 
Findings of this kind can be riveting. They are especially so in the 
lectures displaying how American courts are handling false conflicts, 
true conflicts, and unprovided-for cases. Symeonides discovers, for 
example, that in fully two thirds of the unprovided-for cases surveyed 
by him, the court applied the defendant-protecting law of an 
uninterested state. Fully two thirds. Symeonides points out that these 
48. See also Symeon C. Symeonides, The Need for a Third Conflicts Restatement (And a 
Proposal for Tort Conflicts), 75 IND. L. J. 437 (2000). 
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appalling results were achieved through the Second Restatement or 
other approaches that led judges to believe that they were not 
authorized to analyze governmental interests.49 He notes that, even 
when the defendant-favoring law was forum law, forum law was 
applied not as residual law, as Currie recommended, but - in the 
absence of significant contacts at the forum - on the basis of 
insignificant contacts. Sometimes the law of the uninterested place of 
injury was chosen to protect the tortfeasor - a thoroughly irrational 
result, since, as we have seen, the general public policy of a place of 
injury would undoubtedly be better served by application of the 
remedial law available at the forum. Intriguingly, Symeonides reports 
these sorts of findings with full comprehension, but without dismay. 
Dean Symeonides might regret such results - we do not know 
whether he does or not - as falling short of what he would call 
"material justice." But I read him as satisfied by such results - that to 
him they are examples of what he would call, with the late David 
Cavers, "conflicts justice."50 In his thinking, such results may well be 
hopeful signs that principle can prevail over mere sympathy. The 
forum, in his view, must be neutral, not "selfish" and "unilateral." 
These cautionary ideas become even more imperative, in his view, 
when the forum is an uninterested one. Indeed, an aggregation of 
contacts, albeit insignificant contacts, in Symeonides' view, is useful in 
otherwise unprovided-for cases. Even insignificant contacts can serve 
as neutral tie-breakers, leading courts away from the "selfish" and 
"unilateral" law of the forum in half the cases. It is the clincher to an 
argument of this kind that in fact courts do seem to be acting under 
the impress of such ideas. As Symeonides' charts suggest, courts seem 
to be deciding conflicts cases of all kinds more by unreasoned contact­
counting than anything else. But Symeonides is not in the business of 
criticizing these cases. To him, they speak volumes. These cases, just 
or unjust, rational or not, are authority. 
Of course, as Symeonides is fully aware, application of the 
defendant-protecting law of an uninterested state in a case of tort is 
irrational and unjust. Such a result is obviously a denial of material 
justice. But I part company with Symeonides when he does not find 
such a result too irrational to fit his idea of conflicts justice. Courts 
must presume the truth of a complaint in hearing argument on a 
choice-of-law issue bearing on ultimate liability. So when a court 
49. For the misleading mechanics of Restatement (Second), see Weinberg, A Structural 
Revision, supra note 27, at 477-82. 
50. David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem: Addendum 1972, 17 
HARV. INT'L L. J. 651, 652-55 (1976) (clarifying his concern as one for "conflicts justice"). 
Cavers had originally urged, quite to the contrary, the higher ideal of "justice in the 
individual case." See David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. 
L. REV. 173, 193, 198-200 (1933). 
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chooses the defendant-protecting law of an uninterested state, a 
presumptively meritorious claim is defeated for no reason. The best 
that can be said of a tort case applying the defendant-protecting law of 
an uninterested state is that at least the defense was good under some 
state's law, and at least the defendant with this plausible though 
irrelevant defense was protected from having to pay for his tort, with 
whatever social benefits inhere in allowing defendants or their insurers 
to keep their money. But I cannot help thinking it unwise to protect 
the defendant if his own state would not. On the other hand, the 
plaintiff-favoring law in an unprovided-for case is likely, at least, to 
reflect general policies both states share. Although no law "applies" in 
an unprovided-for case, all states share the general policies underlying 
tort law, policies favoring compensation, deterrence, and risk­
spreading. Defenses, on the other hand, often embody special local 
concerns that may not reflect substantive policies that are as widely 
shared.51 
Why is irrationality in choice of law so intractable? Is there not 
some general but principled guide that will enable judges to decide 
cases with less damage? A just result is not a bad thing. Result­
orientedness, unprincipled as it is said to be, may not be as bad as the 
unjust results avoided by it.52 Yet even if we were willing to accept a 
rule that reads, "Let the plaintiff have a chance to prove her case," or, 
"Law at the plaintiff's option," we still might not have found a rule 
51.  Procedural defenses and other defenses off the merits typically do embody 
somewhat shared policies; but their protections of nonresident defendants are at best 
incidental to their forum-protecting or forum-enhancing purposes. When a statute of 
limitations is applied qua forum law, it is properly applied either to protect the forum from 
stale claims or, arguably, to keep the door open to suit by residents. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 142(g) (permitting the forum to apply its own longer 
statute unless the forum has little interest in doing so). At the 1991 meeting of the ALI I 
moved an amendment from the floor, that present section 142(g) be added to section 142, 
and this motion carried. I argued that it would be anomalous if the forum could apply its 
own longer statute only to benefit nonresident plaintiffs. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 69TH ANNUAL MEETING, at 211-216 (1992). The Supreme 
Court has held that the forum always has constitutional power over the limitation of actions, 
Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988). See Louise Weinberg, Choosing Law: The 
Limitations Debates, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 683. But see, e.g. , Kathryn F. Nelson, The 1990 
Federal "Fallback" Statute of Limitations: Limitations by Default, 72 NEB. L. REV. 454 (1993) 
(criticizing § 142(g) as making it impossible for defendants to plan since they cannot tell 
when they have achieved repose). This criticism of the forum's longer statute subordinates 
the plaintiffs substantive claim to the defendant's alleged need to plan, without taking into 
account that the defendant typically does not plan a tort, would not do so depending on the 
length of some preferred statute of limitations, and that the defendant's insurer has actuarial 
expertise and a full opportunity ex ante to take into consideration the longest likely period of 
repose. Moreover, Nelson's view would permit defendants to carry their statute of 
limitations about with them wherever they commit their torts. Yet the policy of repose for 
the defendant would be of scant concern to the forum qua forum, being more particularly a 
concern of the state in which the defendant is based, whether at the forum or another state. 
52 See generally Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 GEO. L. J. 53 (1991); Weinberg, 
On Departing from Forum Law, supra note 36. 
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that would produce material justice in all cases. Some time ago I tried 
to come to grips with the problem of immoral law.53 I posited 
intolerable law, the law of slavery, in a contact state. I found no 
standard rule of choice that could be relied on to avoid outcomes that 
seemed to me plainly immoral. The problem inheres in the very idea 
of a body of rules governing choices of law. Superimposing an abstract 
choice-of-law process upon a case can insulate the mind from needful 
thought. It can also insulate the mind from the plight of the parties, 
the substance of law, and the requisites of justice in the individual 
case. As the legal realists warned, the more principled the application 
the more arbitrary the likely result. 
V. THE LAW OF THE FORUM 
Of course, unfettered judicial discretion is hardly a palatable or 
even workable option. Some guidance is usually welcome. Even a 
seemingly inflexible rule can offer political cover in a difficult 
situation, or an escape from it. A default position can be particularly 
useful. Default rules are invented to resolve the problem of the 
insoluble problem in a way that will do least harm. 
As far as a default position is concerned, it might not be a bad idea 
to return to Brainerd Currie's original recommendation of residual 
forum law for the insoluble choice-of-law problem. Although forum 
law must be resisted in an immoral polity, forum law in America today 
ought to work. It certainly ought to work for Dean Symeonides, if only 
because, historically, forum law has been the overwhelming judicial 
choice. After all, judges are sworn to enforce and uphold their own 
states' laws. We can hang on to that. 
Other vital needs are served by forum law in every category of 
cases. The court applying its own law, even the uninterested court, at 
least vindicates policies declared in its own legislation or case law. 
Moreover, the court applying its own law avoids the discriminations 
that departures from forum law must entail.54 (Symeonides believes 
that arguments about discrimination are specious. He says that those 
arguments have been overcome, but he offers no authority for that 
53. Louise Weinberg, Methodological Interventions and the Slavery Cases, or, Night­
Thoughts of a Legal Realist, 56 MD. L. REV. 1316 (1997). For more well-known efforts, see, 
e.g., PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY 
(1981); ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS (1975); A. E. Keir Nash, In re Radical Interpretations of American Law: The 
Relation of Law and History, 82 MICH. L. REV. 274 (1983); John Phillip Reid, Lessons of 
Lumpkin: A Review of Recent Literature on Law, Comity, and the Impending Crisis, 23 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 571 (1982); Note, American Slavery and the Conflict of Laws, 71 COLUM. 
L. REV. 74, 75 (1971). 
54. See Weinberg, On Departing from Forum Law, supra note 36. 
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view, and I am unaware of any.55) Although, of course, in a true 
conflict case, both states have constitutional power, the forum that 
departs from its own presumably remedial law56 in a true conflict case 
may be discriminating between two classes of its resident plaintiffs. It 
is permitting residents injured by residents to recover, but denying 
relief to residents injured by nonresidents, even though both classes of 
defendants are within the forum's jurisdiction ex hypothesi. This 
discrimination will seem particularly arbitrary where the nonresident 
defendant has entered the forum state and injured the resident 
plaintiff at her home there. Moreover, the forum departing from its 
own remedial law in a true conflict case is also discriminating against 
its resident defendants, requiring them to pay for their torts in wholly 
domestic cases, while permitting nonresident defendants within its 
jurisdiction to escape liability for the same torts. Of course, these 
choices of law are not arbitrary or irrational in a true conflict case. But 
they are discriminatory, since the tortfeasor's nonresidence is 
irrelevant to the remedial interests of the forum. Consider also that 
plaintiffs are likely to litigate at home, an observation Dean 
Symeonides finds substantiated statistically, and that forum law is very 
likely to be constitutional if it favors the resident plaintiff, since she is 
likely to be within its intended protections. 
Although arguments supporting choices of forum law, or law that 
frankly favors the plaintiff, would not appeal to Dean Symeonides' 
55. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The 
Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 277-78 (1992) 
(acknowledging that, at best, judges can choose only between the lesser of two kinds of 
discrimination, interstate discrimination caused by interest analysis and intrastate 
discrimination caused by territorialism). As might be expected from an unreconstructed 
territorialist, Professor Laycock chooses intrastate discrimination as the lesser of two evils, 
and relies on the fact that the Founders did not provide against intrastate discrimination. 
Certainly there is no explicit equal protection clause in the Fifth Amendment, and even if 
there had been, there was no mechanism for making the Bill of Rights applicable to the 
states. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV deals only with interstate 
discrimination. But given the need to include the slave states in the Union, the Founders 
could not give us an equal protection clause. For the same reason, the Founders left civil 
rights vis-a-vis the states generally in the hands of the states themselves. Article IV aside, the 
national Constitution was not addressed to intrastate governance. Thus, the want of an equal 
protection clause, and indeed, the want of a Fourteenth Amendment, affords scant support 
for Laycock's inference that the Founders "did not fear" intrastate discrimination. Rather, it 
was an issue they could not and did not address. I should add that the founding generation 
did not have the advantage of modern choice-of-law methods. Creatures of the 
Enlightenment that they were, I should think judges of the Founding era would have 
preferred interest analysis to territorialism, since territorialism relies only on mechanical 
formalae, whatever their virtues, whereas interest analysis relies on reason. See, e.g., Chief 
Justice Marshall's understanding in 1803, supra note 30, of the need for rational construction 
of Jaw before it can be applied. 
56. I posit remedial law at the forum because the plaintiff has the choice of forum. But 
of course, it often happens that the plaintiff, with little real opportunity for forum shopping, 
sues at home, although the Jaw of the forum is unfavorable to her, relying on the Jaw of some 
other contact state. 
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sense of fair play and evenhandedness, there are other good reasons, 
beyond the need to avoid discrimination, that should counsel courts to 
steer clear of defendant-favoring law when plaintiff-favoring law is 
available. Systematic choices of plaintiff-favoring law are better public 
policy than systematic choices of defendant-favoring law. When 
defendants engage in risky activities in reliance upon lax standards in 
their home states, shared public policies (favoring safety and fair 
dealing) would seein better served not by indulging such defendants in 
their race to the regufatory bottom, but rather by permitting plaintiffs 
injured by those activities to seek enforcement of higher legal 
standards. It is also sound public policy, universally recognized in 
American tort law, that innocent plaintiffs not bear the risk of their 
own injuries. Moreover, a court denying its own law to the suitor who 
has come to it for relief risks contributing to a regime of global 
lawiessness. For surely global lawlessness must follow from endemic 
non-enforcement of law and widespread denials of access to justice.57 
Thus, the forum generally will have sound reasons to apply its own 
law. And forum law is likely to favor the plaintiff, since the forum is 
the plaintiff's to choose. Currie's recommendation of the law of the 
forum as the preferred residual choice seems right, although he was 
diplomatic enough and conservative enough not to give these sorts of 
reasons. 
The argument is sometimes made that the defendant is unfairly 
surprised and cannot adequately structure its enterprise if it is to be 
stripped of its defenses under an interested state's laws. Yet a 
defendant's insurer is the paradigmatic actuarial expert, and has every 
opportunity to structure the insured's coverage accordingly. It has 
every opportunity to adjust the defendant's premiums to take into 
account this and other risks. Given the near universality of liability 
insurance among suable defendants, it is somewhat unreal to speak of 
"unfair surprise" to tort defendants. They have insured against 
liability precisely because they anticipate it under some state's laws. 
But what should be the result when the forum has unfavorable law, 
but the plaintiff must sue there? This is commonly the situation in the 
unprovided-for case. Should the forum in an unprovided-for case 
depart from its own defendant-favoring law to let the plaintiff prove 
her case? Even such a departure might be discriminatory. When the 
plaintiff must sue at home, it would be discriminatory to permit her to 
recover if the other state would let her, if the forum would deny relief 
to plaintiffs in wholly domestic cases. A departure from defendant-
57. I argue this in Weinberg, Against Comity, supra note 52. For relevant recent 
discussion see, e.g., Robert Wai, Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The 
Regulatory Function of Private International Law in an Era of Globalization, 40 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 209 (2002); Edward T. Swaine, The Local Law of Global Antitrust, 43 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 627 (2001); Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L. J. 
1 (1991). 
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favoring forum law would also discriminate between defendants in 
domestic cases, who are protected from liability, and defendants in 
conflicts cases, who are not. The forum can escape this bind by frankly 
acknowledging that the other state's remedial law is "better" law, and 
adopting it as its own.58 
VI. THE "Loss OF INNOCENCE" 
How does Symeonides come out on this most interesting of 
conflicts questions? What is his preferred default position for 
otherwise insoluble cases? Here, his thinking may have been cloiided 
by a certain over-refinement. Much of Symeonides' book is organized 
to distinguish between "loss-distributing" and "conduct-regulating" 
law.59 For example, compensatory damages, he explains, are "loss­
distributing," and properly the business of the place of injury or the 
plaintiff's residence. Punitive damages, on the other hand, are 
"conduct regulating," and properly the business of the place of 
wrongful conduct. Symeonides has been among the important 
popularizers of this distinction, but it is surprising that he has taken it 
so seriously. Professor Little recently described this sort of distinction, 
correctly, I think, as spurious and "hair-splitting."6() Symeonides 
appears to have been influenced by the doubtful - even 
embarrassingly wrong - New York case that launched these 
categories, Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America. 61 In that case, the court 
was so blinded by its characterization of the defense of charitable 
immunity as "loss-allocating," that, in the midst of an expensive "I 
love New York" campaign intended to attract tourists, the highest 
court in New York, in effect, declared open season on visiting Boy 
Scouts. Disasters like this occur, as the legal realists warned, when we 
are overly abstract about choosing law. It is an exercise in specious 
reasoning to purport to choose between laws we have pigeon-holed in 
advance. That is the way law was chosen under the First Restatement, a 
58. See Weinberg, A Structural Revision, supra note 27, at 501-03 (arguing that it is 
better judicial process for courts applying non-forum law to "adopt" rather than "choose" 
it). 
59. See also La. Civ. Code art. 3544; Symeon Symeonides, Louisiana's New Law of 
Choice of Law for Tort Conflicts: An Exegesis, 66 TUL. L. REV. 677, 699, 715-31 (1992). 
60. Laura E. Little, Hairsplitting and Complexity in Conflict of Laws: The Paradox of 
Formalism, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 925, 934 (2004). See also, e.g., William A. Reppy, Jr., 
Codifying Interest Analysis in the Torts Chapter of a New Conflicts Restatement, 75 IND. L. J. 
591, 594 (2000). 
61. 480 N.E.2d 679, 686 (N.Y. 1985) (applying the charitable immunity law of New 
Jersey to defeat the wrongful death claim of the family of a child who committed suicide 
after being sexually abused on a scouting trip in New York, although under New York law 
the organization was not immune, in part on the ground that charitable immunity is loss­
distributing rather than conduct-regulating). 
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process the late David Cavers derided as "jurisdiction-selecting."62 
Jurisdiction-selecting rules wind up choosing places, not laws. The 
danger in choosing territory instead of law lies in allocating governing 
power to a state before we know what that state's law is,63 and, in so 
doing, insulating the choice from both the living case and the 
operation of reason. 
The mistake comes back to haunt Symeonides in his discussion of 
products liability cases. In charting his products liability conflicts,64 
Symeonides reveals to us that in more than half the cases studied, 
courts are choosing law that favors defendants. In other words, the 
makers and distributors of defective products, in more than half the 
cases, contrary to the most basic policies underlying products liability 
law, are succeeding in shifting the social cost of the injuries they cause 
to the injured and their dependents. Symeonides is struck by these 
unlikely findings. He suggests that a newly conservative judiciary may 
be partly responsible. He thinks that without modern conflicts 
methods the defendant tilt might be even heavier. Defendant-favoring 
outcomes, he supposes, might also to some extent be a consequence of 
the tort reform movement. 
But then, swinging into his discussion of products cases, 
Symeonides situates products liability outside the ordinary law of tort. 
Ordinary tort law, he explains, is "conduct-regulating," while products 
liability is "loss-distributing." And indeed, the distinction makes sense, 
considered as an abstract proposition. Since products liability in our 
time has generally not been based on fault, it seems unconvincing to 
argue that it is fairer to place the risk of injury on innocent defendants 
than on innocent plaintiffs. It seems more convincing to ground 
products liability on risk-spreading policies, sensibly allocating to 
defendants the burden of insuring, especially since defendants are in a 
better position to spread the costs of insuring. Such loss-shifting and 
risk-spreading policies, though contested, are well understood and 
widely shared. 
So far so good. But what happens when a true conflict is about 
punitive damages in a products case? That was the problem before the 
federal court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 1996, in Kelly 
62. See David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 
173, 180 (1933). 
63. Jurisdiction-selecting appears to be unavoidable when the conflict is between federal 
and state governance. The problem arises from the exigencies of Erie on the one hand and 
the Supremacy Clause on the other. See generally Joseph P. Bauer, The Erie Doctrine 
Revisited: How a Conflicts Perspective Can Aid the Analysis, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1235 
(1999); Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State Conflict of Laws: "Actual" Conflicts, 70 TEX. L. 
REV. 1743 (1992). 
64. See also Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law for Products Liability: The 1990s 
and Beyond, 78 TuL. L. REV. 1247 (2004). 
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v. Ford Motor Co.65 Kelly was a products case in which punitive 
damages were sought for a wrongful death. The decedent was killed in 
her home state, Pennsylvania, while driving a defective car she had 
bought there. The only out-of-state feature of the case was that the car 
had been designed and manufactured in Michigan. Under 
Pennsylvania law, the plaintiffs were entitled to punitive damages. 
Under Michigan law, only compensatory damages were available. The 
federal diversity court, sitting in Pennsylvania, opined, without 
consulting Pennsylvania policy on the question, that punitive damages 
are excessive and destabilizing to the financial stability of defendants. 
The court then held conclusorily that Pennsylvania would choose 
Michigan law on this issue, thus denying punitive damages to the 
plaintiff. The court cited no authority for the proposition that in a 
products case Pennsylvania would choose foreign law to avoid 
imposing punitive damages on an egregiously negligent defendant who 
has injured a Pennsylvanian on Pennsylvania roads. But Dean 
Symeonides, in a startlingly revelatory passage, praises the Kelly court 
for resisting the "all-too-common temptation" to apply forum law to 
favor the local bereaved. 
This sort of rigor, a resistance to retributive justice (or, in other 
cases, even to compassion), can have its seductions, even for very fair­
minded people. There are those for whom deference and comity are 
obviously to be preferred to a forum's "selfish" interests. To be sure, 
Michigan, as the place of manufacture, has an interest in protecting its 
defendant car makers from non-compensatory damages, in order to 
protect its automotive industry without denying full compensatory 
damages to those injured by the industry's products. This makes the 
case a true conflict, but it does not decide the case. The fact that 
Michigan is an interested state does not strip Pennsylvania of its own 
policies and interests. As the place of injury and the place where its 
citizen was killed, Pennsylvania had every interest in punishment and 
deterrence, interests based on road safety policies widely shared with 
other states. Indeed, it seems odd that the manufacturer in Kelly 
should escape the force of Pennsylvania's usual punitive damages rule 
because it sent its instrument of death into Pennsylvania instead of 
manufacturing it there. The federal district court also had a process 
interest in evenhandedly affording the Pennsylvania family the same 
full measure of Pennsylvania's retributive justice that Pennsylvania 
courts meted out in other cases. (I pause to note with some 
amusement that all but one of the affiliating contacts with the case 
were in Pennsylvania - a bit of old-fashioned contact-counting of the 
sort that Symeonides is generally content to use as a tie-breaker.) 
65. Kelly v. Ford Motor Co., 933 F. Supp. 465 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
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Was Symeonides' defense of Kelly a slip? Well, yes and no. 
Symeonides believes that punitive damages are "conduct-regulating" 
and thus are the proper business of the place of conduct On the other 
hand, Kelly was a products case, and for Symeonides, products cases 
are cases of "loss distribution," not "conduct regulation." Loss 
distribution, for Symeonides, is the proper business of the place where 
the loss was suffered. All this puts Symeonides in the mind-boggling 
position of attributing conduct-regulating power in Kelly to the non­
conduct-regulating state. 
Kelly can be evaluated without tying oneself into knots of that 
kind. In thinking about Kelly, nothing should turn on the fact that it is 
a products case, since it is hardly a no-fault case. The issue was 
punitive damages, after all, and punitive damages are awarded only on 
proof of fault - egregious fault. "Egregious fault," in fact, is 
Pennsylvania's own test for punitive damages.66 It appears that 
Pennsylvania, both as place of injury and place where the decedent 
resided, had conduct-regulating interests at least as compelling as 
Michigan's, wherever the actionable conduct occurred. Egregiously 
causing the death of a Pennsylvania woman on a Pennsylvania road is 
certainly conduct that cries out for punitive damages. But on this issue 
it is hard to see why the place of manufacture, for all its power in its 
own courts, should trump the place of injury in its courts.67 As the 
place of manufacture, Michigan did and does have general regulatory 
interests. But, in Kelly, Michigan's policy was not to regulate its 
manufacturers of egregiously faulty cars, beyond their ordinary 
exposure to compensatory damages. No "regulatory" purpose at all 
can be attributed to Michigan vis-a-vis punitive damages. Regulating 
the Ford Motor Company to discourage egregious fault was 
Michigan's prerogative, but Michigan failed to exercise it. All we can 
reasonably say is that Michigan law is intended to protect its local 
automotive industry from all but strictly compensatory liabilities -
even, or rather, especially, in cases of egregious fault on the industry's 
part. Of course, Michigan may constitutionally protect its resident 
companies from punitive damages in its own courts. But it is hard to 
see why this Michigan policy, which seems about as "selfish" as it 
could be short of denying damages altogether, should have any 
extraterritorial effect at all. Pennsylvania was under no obligation to 
subordinate its own law and policies to another state's law and 
66. See, e.g. , Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 494 A.2d 1088, 1096 (Pa. 1985) (holding 
under Pennsylvania law that punitive damages will be imposed for egregious misconduct). 
67. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.) (holding, in a California case 
in which a California plaintiff was injured in California by a vehicle driven by a driver for the 
University of Nevada, that California had legitimate governmental interests such that it 
could constitutionally apply its no-sovereign-immunity rule to a sister state, Nevada, even 
though Nevada was substantially immune under its own law). 
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policies, certainly not to another state's interests in protecting its local 
industry's egregious wrongdoing, and certainly not where the result is 
an unsafe condition on Pennsylvania's roads, and the death of a 
Pennsylvanian. 
By not falling into the "temptation" of allowing the plaintiffs 
access to punitive damages, the federal court in Kelly failed to impress 
upon the defendant the gravity of conduct that caused a death far 
from the place of manufacture; failed to punish the defendant for it, 
failed to deter future such conduct, with foreseeable impact on road 
safety, and failed to pressure the defendant to pay the costs of 
maintaining better standards. These are concerns Pennsylvania shares 
with many states, even if subordinated in Michigan. Dean Symeonides 
deplores "unilateralism," a vice he attributes to modern methods in 
choice of law,68 and esteems "multilateralism"69 instead. But would not 
"multilateralism" have been better served in Kelly by vindication of 
these multistate policies than by deference to Michigan's "selfish" 
interest in protecting its industry's poor manufacturing practices and 
unsafe designs? The federal court in Pennsylvania, it appears, fell into 
the "temptation" of deferring to defendant-favoring law, and in so 
doing flouted the laws of the state in which it sat.70 It did so without 
the rigor of the required vicarious analysis on the merits, instead 
concealing this departure from forum law and policy behind a veil of 
conflicts verbiage.71 Had the federal court done its work on the merits, 
68. Dean Symeonides also spells out his argument favoring "rnultilateralisrn" over 
"unilateralism" in Symeon C. Syrneonides, American Choice of Law at the Dawn of the 21st 
Century, 37 WILLAMETIE L. REV. 1 (2001). 
69. For recent comment on arguments of this class, see generally Stanley E. Cox, 
Substantive, Multilateral, and Unilateral Choice-of-Law Approaches, 37 WILLAMETIE L. 
REV. 171 (2001). 
70. Cf Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (holding that the 
obligation of a federal district court applying state law is to apply the whole law of the state, 
including its choice rules). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not spoken to the issue of 
choice of law in products cases, but lower Pennsylvania courts in products cases evidently 
are choosing the law of the plaintiffs residence and not the place of manufacture. See, e.g., 
Lewis v. Bayer AG. 2004 WL 1 146692 (Pa. Corn. Pl. 2004) (not reported in A.2d) (holding in 
a class action that liability for statin-caused health problems would be governed by the law 
of each plaintiffs residence) .  Cf. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 424 (1979): "In this case, 
California's interest is the . . .  substantial one of providing full protection to those who are 
injured on its highways through the negligence of both residents and nonresidents.") 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). Pennsylvania's retributive policy might even 
have gained force from the fact that the defendant's own state, the place of conduct, would 
not itself penalize the company's egregious fault - especially if a Pennsylvania court would 
have taken notice of the fact that over 40,000 Americans die in traffic accidents every year, 
hundreds of Pennsylvanians among them. Nor is there any indication in Pennsylvania cases 
that Pennsylvania shares the postmodern view that punitive damages are disfavored. The 
conclusion seems inescapable that the federal court in Kelly decided the case in gross 
disregard of the forum state's interests. 
71.  Had the court in Kelly been a state court, after the departure from Pennsylvania law 
Pennsylvania's policy would have been perceived to have been eroded, and might no longer 
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it would have identified and vindicated Pennsylvania's policy favoring 
the punishment of egregious fault in causing a fatal tort to its citizens 
on its roads. By so doing it would have avoided discriminating 
irrationally between two classes of Pennsylvania's decedents - those 
who could recover because the product that killed them at home in 
Pennsylvania was made in Pennsylvania, and those who could not 
because the product that killed them at home in Pennsylvania was sent 
into Pennsylvania.72 
The key to the riddle of Symeonides' satisfaction with Kelly is that, 
for him, modernist thinking about conflicts is somewhat to be 
regretted. Modernist thinking has been a letting-go of what 
Symeonides believes to be the highest ideal of judicial process: 
neutrality. He mourns this loss of apparent neutrality as a "loss of 
innocence."73 Yet as Symeonides continues his deep conversation with 
himself, the reader begins to appreciate how much of the author's 
thinking is informed by a lively consciousness of the legal realists' 
message, and by the humane view that justice as a general rule ought 
to triumph. The excitement of the book, its building interest, is in 
Symeonides' continuing inner struggle with these conflicting ideals. He 
personifies in himself the underlying clash of values that is at the heart 
of the choice-of-law problem. 
VII. "SMART RULES" AND "CONFLICTS JUSTICE" 
Arguing his way toward his ultimate proposal, Symeonides 
tentatively considers the possible advantages of rules that point 
toward law that is substantively "better." He is keenly aware of 
choice-of-law policies counseling avoidance of substandard law, law of 
the kind he fell into the trap of approving in his discussion of Kelly.74 
Here, in this momentary dalliance with "better law," he is evidently 
have been describable unequivocally as favoring punitive damages for egregious fault. See 
Weinberg, A Structural Revision, supra note 27, at 502 (arguing that departures from forum 
law indicate the forum's preference for foreign law; suggesting that 'the cleaner, more honest 
approach would be for the forum to "adopt" rather than "choose" another state's law when 
that state's law is perceived to be "better"); Weinberg, On Departing from Forum Law, 
supra note 36, at 601 ("a court that has found the law of a sister state to be 'better' than its 
own . . .  has inescapably discerned its own current policy. Once that happens, the cleaner, 
more direct approach would be to make a change in local law. Even a statutory rule may be 
interpreted to conform to existing local policy, although this latter option may not always be 
practicable; but setting to one side the stumbling-block of outworn or wrong-headed 
legislation, identification of 'better law' in a sister state will inevitably suggest to the forum 
the advisability of adopting the sister state's view as its own."). 
72 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
73. Symeonides, American Choice of Law, supra note 68, at 45-46. 
74. But see the close of note 70, supra, for the possibility that in today's conservative 
climate the law considered "better" in the past might be considered "substandard" today, 
and vice versa. 
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influenced by the work of the late Friedrich Juenger.75 I am not quite 
sure how Juenger's view differs from the "better law" approach 
proposed by the late Professor Leflar.76 For both writers, in the end it 
is plaintiff-favoring law that is "better," and defenses that tend to be 
"substandard." " Substandard" was Juenger's word for lax regulatory 
standards and special local defenses. 
Symeonides favorably contrasts Juenger's proposal of rules 
pointing to quality law with the usual sorts of rules that point to places, 
without regard to the quality.of the law at the chosen place. Juenger's 
rules do succeed in escaping the opprobrium of being "jurisdiction­
selecting. "77 Dean Syrneonides acknowledges that his own conflicts 
codes are in their nature "jurisdiction-selecting," but explains that 
they have been influenced by "better law" thinking. Yet he also 
confesses unease about the "better law" project. Which laws are 
better? Characteristically avoiding the political aspect of the question, 
Symeonides simply points out that cataloguing all laws on a scale of 
intrinsic merit would be a hopeless task. But is discerning better law 
really so hopeless a task? Like many conservatives, Symeonides does 
not believe, or perhaps does not want to believe, the implicit message 
in both Leflar's and Juenger's work, that, generally, plaintiff-favoring 
law is "better." Their insight gains force from another mid-twentieth 
century modernist insight, that the tort plaintiff is, in effect, an agent 
of enforcement of law - a private attorney general.78 These modernist 
perceptions, old-fashioned as they may seem now, are not the less 
sound. The question, for Symeonides, becomes whether the vices of 
modernism outweigh these virtues. 
Symeonides presents an interesting table of the changes that the 
conflicts revolution has wrought. He identifies contrasting 
characteristic features of the old-style "rules" and new-style 
"approaches." As we have seen, he thinks rules tend to be 
"multilateral," appreciative of the concerns of other sovereigns, while 
modern approaches, with their emphasis on the forum's interests, are 
"unilateral." Rules offer "certainty," the new approaches "flexibility." 
He contrasts the "territoriality" of the rules with the "non­
territoriality" of modern approaches, and envisions a new role for 
75. See FRIEDRICH K. JuENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE (1993); 
Russell J. Weintraub, Choosing Law with an Eye on the Prize, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 705 
(1994) (reviewing Juenger). 
76. See Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 267, 282-304 (1966). 
77. For the vice of "jurisdiction-selecting rules," see supra text accompanying note 62. 
78. See, e.g. , Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam) 
("When a plaintiff brings an action . . .  he . . .  does so not for himself alone but also as a 
'private attorney general,' vindicating a policy . . . .  " (citation omitted)). 
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territorialism in choice of law. He ascribes to forum preference a near­
tribalism, and associates it with our "loss of innocence." Even so, he 
ventures to suggest that, taken all in all, the conflicts revolution has 
been a good thing. In particular, he acknowledges that "approaches," 
unlike rules, need not fall into the trap of being "jurisdiction­
selecting" rather than "law-selecting." But in the end he admonishes 
us that the loss of innocence entailed in content-based examination of 
law should nevertheless limit the exercise. 
Given the preponderance, then, as he sees it, of arguments more 
favorable to "rules," Symeonides comes down predictably on the side 
of "rules." He believes the pendulum has swung too far in the 
direction of flexibility and away from certainty. Agreeing with 
European critics, he feels that the American conflicts revolution has 
gone on too long and it is time for it to stabilize. What is needed, he 
concludes, is a way of employing the best of both techniques. The 
answer must be some better combination of the new with the old. 
His ultimate conclusion, which he shares with some modernists, is 
that it ought to be possible now to write "smart" rules that will codify 
what is best about the American conflicts revolution, rules that will 
take into account state policies and interests, and yet will guide the 
judges toward the true rules made manifest in their actual work.79 He 
has aspired to those sorts of goals in his own codifications. He urges 
judges to overcome their "anti-rule syndrome." As for the kinds of 
rules he would propose, he favors capacious, complex rules, that bring 
to bear a multitude of factors and influences - contingent rules with 
fallback positions, sometimes allowing the parties a degree of 
influence upon the choice.80 One need not agree with Symeonides' 
preference for detailed codifications of conflicts law to find his 
argument interesting, fair-minded, and thoughtful. Symeonides' rules 
will be complex because they will be sympathetic articulations of 
considerations gleaned from a lifetime of study of actual cases. 
79. This is also the 1965 proposal of David Cavers, who called for "a body of rules, 
principles and standards of a new sort, developed through the workings of stare decisis and 
the combined efforts of courts and scholars . . . .  " DAVID F. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW 
PROCESS 78 (1965). 
80. These ideas share some of the aspirations, virtues, and (alas) deficiencies of the 
widely ignored rule proposed for mass torts in AM. LAW INST., COMPLEX LITIGATION 
PROJECT (Proposed Final Draft, 1993), which received Symeonides' strong support. The 
author of the proposed rule was Mary Kay Kane. I do not know to what extent Symeonides' 
thinking may have influenced Kane's proposal and vice versa; her choice rule for complex 
cases is like Symeonides' codes in its hierarchy of contingencies and its contact counting. On 
probable reasons for the unenthusiastic reception of Kane's effort, see, e.g., Gene R. Shreve, 
Reform Aspirations of the Complex Litigation Project, 54 LA. L. REV. 1139 (1994); Louise 
Weinberg, Mass Torts at the Neutral Forum: A Critical Analysis of the ALi's Proposed 
Choice Rule, · 56 ALA. L. REV. 807 (1993). Yet these critiques fail to account for the 
successful adoptions of Symeonides' codes, which Kane's rule resembles. 
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But always the problem, for every choice-of-law proposal, however 
well-intended, however closely worked, is the question whether we are 
willing to give up on justice - whether we are willing to be satisfied 
with "conflicts justice," as David Cavers tried to be,81 and as Dean 
Symeonides is trying to be. We arrive, then, with Symeonides, at the 
heart of the matter. Must "conflicts justice" be attainable only at the 
expense of "material justice?" If so, in the face of these conflicting 
demands, must we be content merely with "conflicts justice?" What is 
the right path? Symeonides feels the tug of "material justice." It is a 
powerful aspiration. But somewhat ruefully he confesses that we may 
have to be content with "conflicts justice." We will be successful 
enough if we can achieve that. He understands and regrets that even 
his "smart" rules are likely in a given case to deny "material justice." 
Indeed, as the manipulated but much-praised case of Milliken v. 
Pratt reminds us, "rules," however "smart," cannot guarantee even the 
uniformity and certainty and predictability that Symeonides cares so 
much about. In tort cases - the focus of The American Choice-of-Law 
Revolution - it is difficult even to believe that predictability matters. 
For the most parts torts are unplanned by the parties, rendering 
predictability of the law that will be applied to the tort a non-issue at 
the time of the tort. And, as I have already remarked, tort cases are 
actuarially predicted by the tortfeasor's insurer, an acknowledged 
expert with every opportunity to take into account the range of likely 
choices of law, and to set premiums accordingly. 
81. See CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS, supra note 79, at 86. A personal note: 
I should acknowledge that, although I was not the beneficiary of Cavers' (or anybody else's) 
formal conflicts course, I was Cavers' student (in an irrelevant seminar). Years later, in one 
of his letters, he sent a kind but dispirited warning that "we are in a dying field." I remember 
trying to cheer him up, pointing out in reply how much work needed to be done with new 
problems and emerging technologies, and ending, "These are great days! "  I like to think this 
got him back to work. His last articles were about regulatory problems in the atomic age. He 
would have enjoyed digging into today's problems of globalization, the internet, terrorism. 
See, e.g. , Mathias Reimann, The Yahoo! Case and Conflict of Laws in the Cyberage, 24 
MICH. J. INT'L L. 663 (2003); Noah Feldman, Choices of Law, Choices of War, 25 HARV. J. 
L. & PuB. POL'Y 457 (2002); Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of Prescriptive 
Jurisdiction, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2001). Just before the end, Cavers sent me, out of the blue, 
a pile of fading reprints of his work. I still treasure these, although he must have bestowed 
similar treasures on other whippersnappers. I remain, with Dean Symeonides, one of Cavers' 
many admirers. But Cavers' ideal of "conflicts justice" has always been much less appealing 
to me than his original concern for "justice in the individual case." For this earlier position, 
see Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, supra note 62. It was Cavers' "justice 
in the individual case" that became Willis Reese's lodestar. See Willis L. M. Reese, Conflict 
of Laws and the Restatement Second, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1963, at 690. 
Cavers came under heavy fire - as Reese later would - for the supposed nihilism of 
"justice in the individual case," and, regrettably, backed off, explaining that he had always 
meant only "conflicts justice." CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS, supra note 79, at 
86. To the extent I believe this I hope I am wrong. As for Reese's ordeal, see the account in 
Weinberg, A Structural Revision, supra note 27, at 483-90. 
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A more serious problem for Symeonides' argument from the 
neutral virtues of predictability and uniformity arises from the fact 
that Symeonides' effort is a modern as well as a traditional one. He 
will not be content simply to try to cabin the discretion of judges, but 
rather will try to maximize the appeal of his rules, incorporating 
insights from the modern approaches. He will consider the interests of 
the various concerned states. While cueing the rules to judicial 
experience, he will afford reason a modest corrective role. His 
previous codifications, which he does not here discuss, therefore 
characteristically consist of multifarious, compound, multi-phase, 
multi-inquiry rules, rich in content and complex in application. And 
therein lies the difficulty. "Smart" rules will, in their very complexity, 
undermine predictability, and with it uniformity and certainty. I 
cannot refrain from remembering Walter Wheeler Cook's rather 
savage remark that those who demand that choice rules give us both 
uniformity and justice are like "babies crying for the moon. "82 
Symeonides feels he has done the best he could, given the 
intractability of the problem and the nature of codifications. His sort 
of rules, he believes, will bring to the choice-of-law problem a needed 
balance. In Symeonides' thinking, a "smart" rule would recover some 
part of our lost "innocence" by balancing the claims of reason, shared 
norms, and material justice against the claims of "conflicts justice,'' or, 
more particularly, neutrality. Whether or not one agrees with him, 
Symeonides' effort to justify his work on politically neutral grounds -
his struggle to reclaim "innocence" - renders his work more broadly 
attractive and sympathetic than any less balanced view could be. 
But why should reason, and shared norms, and justice, have to be 
"balanced" against any ideal, even neutrality? In attempting to find a 
balance between justice and evenhandedness, Symeonides' rules could 
risk displacement of more genuine and weighty systemic goals. As to 
this, with the empiricist's fatalism, Dean Symeonides can answer 
arguments from reason, shared norms, and justice itself, with an 
argument from hard fact. He points out that in litigation today, some 
rules - like it or lump it - j ust do tend to trump reason, shared 
norms, and justice - in virtually all courts. 
Symeonides gives the example of the law of the joint domicile of 
the parties. He shows that today the law of a joint domicile is almost 
always applied, no matter what the issue, no matter what the 
circumstances. An exception for law that is "conduct regulating"83 is 
currently making inroads on the joint domicile, but the joint domicile 
retains much of its attraction for judges. Their curious faith in the joint 
82. Walter Wheeler Cook, An Unpublished Chapter of the Logical and Legal Bases of 
the Conflict of Laws, 37 U. ILL. L. REV. 418, 420 (1943). 
83. See Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., 480 N.E.2d 679, 684-85 (N.Y. 1985). 
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domicile seems to be a species of mass mistake, something like the 
ineradicable common belief that the Declaration of Independence is 
either in the Constitution, or is the Constitution. 
There is indeed a pervasive faith in the soundness of governance of 
virtually any issue by the state in which both parties reside. This must 
be an accident of history. At the start of the interest-analysis 
revolution, interest analysts were naturally captivated by their newly 
discovered power to identify the most obviously foolish choices of law. 
These were cases in which the courts, not recognizing a false conflict, 
somehow managed to apply the law of the uninterested state rather 
than the interested one. These early wrong cases were cases 
configured like Babcock v. Jackson,· the case in which New York 
famously declined to go on making that error.84 In these sorts of cases 
both parties typically resided in the forum state, where the law favored 
the plaintiff, while the injury occurred in some other state, where the 
law favored the defendant. When the traditional place-of-injury rule 
was applied in these cases, the interested forum - the joint domicile 
of the parties - would wind up applying the non-remedial law of the 
uninterested place of injury, barring suit in its own courts between its 
own residents. Confronted with such unreason, academics in droves, 
and with them judges, became convinced that all joint domicile cases 
must be false conflicts.85 
But it is simply not true that all joint domicile cases are false 
conflicts. If the place of injury is the forum state, with plaintiff­
favoring law, and if the parties are joint domiciliaries of another state 
with defendant-favoring law, the case is a true conflict. In such a case 
the forum, as place of injury, has legitimate governmental interests in 
applying its own remedial law to benefit the nonresident plaintiff, 
notwithstanding the laws of the joint domicile, and therefore has 
constitutional power to do so. Of course the joint domicile always has 
constitutional power too, and may wield that power in its own courts 
to shield its defendant from its own plaintiff's claim. But that fact does 
not strip another interested state of power in its courts. Moreover, the 
interested forum not only can, but should furnish the remedy to the 
nonresident plaintiff, if only to avoid a discriminatory departure from 
its own law. 
A more difficult problem is presented by a true conflict case in 
which the forum is the joint domicile, and has defendant-favoring law. 
84. 230 N.Y.S.2d 1 14 (1962), rev'd, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963) (Fuld, J.). 
85. See, for example, the first of the three "rules" announced in Neumeier v. Keuhner, 
286 N.E.2d 454, 457 (N.Y. 1972) (Fuld, C.J.). There, seeking to fashion choice-of-law rules 
for a class of statutory cases, Chief Judge Fuld first prescribed the law of the joint domicile 
for cases in which the place of injury was elsewhere. Fuld apparently assumed that all cases 
of this kind would be false conflicts. 
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The injury occurred in a sister state with plaintiff-favoring law. It is 
tempting to say that in a case with this configuration, a true conflict, 
the forum should choose the remedial law of the place of injury. In 
this way the joint domicile can vindicate its widely shared general 
remedial policies. After all, if the plaintiff wins on the choice-of-law 
issue she still must try to prove her case, and still can lose it. It seems 
better legal process to let her have her day in court and at least air her 
grievance. At the appellate level the argument for her is even stronger, 
since it would require upsetting a jury verdict in her favor to rule 
against her on the dispositive choice-of-law point. Even so, I believe 
that when the forum with defendant-favoring law is the joint-domicile, 
it should not flee from its own law to the law of the place of injury. To 
do so would be to discriminate between two similar classes of its 
resident defendants. It would be to strip the protections of its own law 
only from its defendants in cases where the injury occurred out of 
state, bestowing them only on defendants injured at home. It would 
also be to discriminate between two classes of its resident plaintiffs, 
furnishing relief only to those injured out of state, while withholding it 
from those injured at home. Departures from forum law are always 
problematic, not least because they tend to be discriminatory in just 
such ways. That the forum has departed from its own law to come to 
the rescue of the plaintiff does not diminish the discrimination the 
departure will entail. In true conflict cases, of course, the application 
of non-forum law would not be arbitrary or irrational. But in 
unprovided-for cases there can be no good reason for discriminatory 
departures from forum law. Again, the forum can sometimes avoid 
such dilemmas by frankly acknowledging that the other state's 
remedial law is "better," and adopting the better rule as its own. In 
any event, since plaintiffs generally do have the choice of forum, my 
hope is that forum preference and plaintiff preference by and large 
will function very similarly as a practical matter.86 
VIII. AGAINST "NEUTRALITY" 
But what could David Cavers have meant by "conflicts justice?" 
Cavers knew that if judicial process appears to be abstract and neutral 
it can satisfy even the loser of a case that he has had a fair hearing. 
Robed Justice, holding aloft her scales, always wears a blindfold. 
Justice must be blind. Cavers, therefore, like Symeonides, attempted 
to fashion choice rules free of the bias of the forum.87 For Cavers, the 
86. Cf Borchers, The Choice-of-Law Revolution, supra note 45, at 383-84 (noting that 
most American courts will choose either the law of the forum or the law that favors the 
plaintiff). 
87. See CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS, supra note 79 (devising "principles of 
preference" to guide choices of law without reference to the biases of the forum); see also 
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forum must be a neutral forum. The judges at a Cavers forum, in other 
words, are freed in an interstate case from their obligation of fidelity 
to their own local legislature and their own local case law. Presumably 
local law has been fashioned with this background understanding, that 
its force is diminished in interstate cases. Other laws and other cases 
must have an equal chance of application, because Justice must be 
blind. 
But what must Justice be blind to? Presumably Justice must be 
blind to the relative celebrity, wealth, political power, or influence of 
the parties. But it is hard to believe that Justice must be blind to 
injustice. Justice cannot be that blind. That being so, I should think 
neutrality and evenhandedness better served by faithful application of 
the law of the forum, when the forum has reason to apply it, than by 
the intercession of abstract methodological interventions which, 
however "smart;" can only deflect judges from that necessary task and 
sworn duty. To the party who has been stripped of the forum's 
protections and who has lost by virtue of abstractly chosen 
governance, the process will not necessarily look innocent. 
Concededly, in the true conflict case, one in which two differing 
laws "apply," neither law will be arbitrary; and in the unprovided-for 
case, both states' laws will. But judges should think long and hard 
before turning away from their "preeminent province and duty to say 
what [their own state's] law is."88 No amount of "conflicts justice" can 
satisfy a resident that a court in her own state was right to deprive her 
of a claim or defense it would have made available to her had her 
opponent not resided elsewhere. Nor can anything explain to a 
nonresident who has come to the interested place of injury for its 
remedial law, why the place of injury, with its obvious governmental 
interest in applying its remedial law to her case, nevertheless 
arbitrarily withholds it from her, as if reserving a scarce commodity for 
its own residents. 
My differences with Symeonides obviously have something to do 
with the old differences between realists and formalists. Realists are 
unembarrassed by justice. The more straightforward a court is about 
providing justice, the more commendable the court, as far as we 
realists are concerned. But to a formalist there is something vulgar, 
political - almost illicit - about justice. When justice triumphs, 
formalists cannot help casting about for some overlooked neutral 
principle which, if applied rigorously enough, would have prevented it. 
Perry Dane, Vested Rights, "Vestedness, " and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L. J. 1 191, 1209 
(1987) (arguing that neutrality is the essential virtue of traditional territorialist approaches). 
88. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.): "It is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." 
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For Dean Symeonides, as for David Cavers, justice is all very well; 
but the jewel in the crown of judicial process is neutrality.89 Neutrality 
ranks highest among all neutral principles. In torts as in contracts, the 
protections of due process will seem insufficient to Symeonides unless 
characterized by disinterestedness and evenhandedness. Unless the 
highest standards of neutrality are maintained, the judicial process, 
and with it the choice-of-law process, as far as he is concerned, cannot 
be "innocent." It is very hard to disagree with argument on this level 
of loftiness and idealism. The formal neutrality that "conflicts justice" 
can provide, at least in theory, has seemed to many to be worth 
striving for. But I cannot help setting a much higher value than 
Symeonides does on "material justice," which certainly is worth 
striving for. 
At the risk of shocking the reader, I venture to say that material 
justice is hardly well served by superimposing upon the parties to a 
tort case, in their actual situation, an ideal of neutrality which can only 
be spurious. I say "spurious," because the very notion of neutrality 
between the parties in an action in tort is utterly at odds with the 
realities of tort litigation. Of course, after a judgment favoring the 
plaintiff, nothing could be clearer than that the defendant is a 
tortfeasor who has caused injury, and the plaintiff an innocent victim. 
There can be no neutrality as between adjudged tortfeasor and victim. 
There is no legal, or indeed moral equivalence between them. But I 
would go further and point out that even before trial and judgment 
there is no legal or moral equivalence between the parties to a tort 
litigation. The tort defendant, although of course entitled to every 
protection of fundamental fairness and due process, enjoys no 
presumption of innocence. Rather, in these civil cases, certainly for 
purposes of deciding a dispositive conflicts question, the presumption 
is that the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint are true. The further 
presumption, for purposes of deciding the conflicts question, is that 
the complaint survives a motion to dismiss on every other ground. In 
other words, for purposes of deciding the conflicts question, the 
complaint is not frivolous. The complaint has merit. The defendant is 
not being pushed to the wall on some trumped-up claim. It therefore 
becomes necessary, if we are to think about a choice of tort law 
without becoming bogged down in irrelevancies, to suppress our 
emotional commitments to defendants who are being pushed to the 
wall on trumped-up claims. There is much to be said for a frank 
recognition that the tort defendant is a presumptive tortfeasor, that 
the plaintiff presumptively has suffered a legally cognizable injury at 
89. For similar views of neutrality, see supra notes 81 and 87. 
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the defendant's hands, and that the law presumptively will, and 
should, furnish a remedy.9() 
In light of these truths, very possibly neutrality as well as 
fundamental fairness would best be served by unwavering application 
of the law of the forum - except, of course, for false conflicts in which 
the forum is the only uninterested state.91 Forum law is the only law 
that blind justice can choose and administer with formal neutrality 
precisely because it applies in all other cases, without variation, 
without fear or favor, and under the direct supervision of the 
legislature. This may well be the only sort of fairness to defendants, 
when it comes to choosing law, that - since plaintiffs choose the 
forum - will not be unfair to plaintiffs. 
ENVOI 
The American Choice-of-Law Revolution is a deeply sincere record 
of its author's intellectual struggle toward solutions of serious 
problems in the conflict of laws. At the same time it is a close study of 
the ways in which American courts are dealing with those problems, 
and a careful consideration of what modern conflicts methods can 
90. Similarly, there can be no neutrality between the parties in a contract case. There is 
no equivalence in law between the parties to an action on the contract. Under the allegations 
of the complaint, the contract debtor is presumptively a deadbeat, seeking to avoid her 
obligations. Under the allegations of the complaint, the plaintiff creditor, with a 
presumptively valid contract, has been left holding an empty bag. It becomes necessary, if we 
are to think about a choice of contract law without becoming bogged down in irrelevancies, 
to suppress our sympathy for debtors who are being pushed to the wall. The aebtor may, if 
in difficult straits, seek whatever protections bankruptcy law may still afford. The contract 
creditor, like the tort plaintiff, has presumptively suffered a legally cognizable injury at the 
debtor's hands, and the law presumptively will, and should, provide a remedy. 
91. Consider, for example, a case in which the law of the forum favors the defendant, 
but the forum's only contact with the case is that the plaintiff resides there. The place of 
injury, where the defendant resides, has plaintiff-favoring law. This is a false conflict, 
because the place of injury, having plaintiff-favoring law, is the only interested state. See 
supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. This requirement of non-forum law at the 
uninterested forum in false conflict cases does not hold for unprovided-for cases. Suppose, 
for example, that the defendant resides at the forum and the forum has plaintiff-favoring 
law. Suppose further that the plaintiff resides at the place of injury, which has defendant­
favoring law. In this latter, unprovided-for case, the forum should apply its own remedial 
law. Since the place of injury is uninterested in application of its particular defense, but 
shares general tort policies with the forum, the best accommodation is forum law. There 
should be an exception to this rule for the unprovided-for case in which the plaintiff is 
injured at home and sues there, the forum having defendant-favoring law. If forum law 
seems unjust in such a case, and I think it does, the injustice arises not from the fact that the 
plaintiff loses, but from the facts that, first, she is suing at home and may not be able to sue 
at a more favorable forum; and, second, that, since the defendant does not reside there, the 
forum has no interest in applying its special defense; but, as the place of injury, it retains its 
general underlying remedial and deterrent tort policies, which would be advanced by 
deference to the remedial law of the sister state. To avoid discriminatory departures from its 
own law, the uninterested forum with non-remedial law should if possible "adopt" rather 
than "choose" the sister-state's rule as its own. See supra note 58. 
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teach us. Whether or not Dean Symeonides' own codifications will be 
entirely successful at what they set out to do, his new book is entirely 
successful as a replication of his struggle. 
In this Review I have brought to bear the methods of interest 
analysis, which Dean Symeonides understands and admires, upon 
some of his own analyses. But my differences from Dean Symeonides 
should not obscure the importance of his book. This is not only a most 
original monograph, not only a maj or contribution to the literature, 
not only a fine course in the conflict of laws, not only a treatise from 
which sophisticates and novices alike can learn much, not only an 
intellectual adventure, but quite simply a book one can very much 
enjoy reading. One can wrestle with it, take issue with it, and yet savor 
it. I had a wonderful time with it. Dean Symeonides has greatly 
enriched the field with this splendid new work. 
